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1 Abstract:
This thesis describes a new trust model for OpenPGP encryption. This
trust model uses conditional rule-based trust to establish key validity and
trust. This thesis describes “Trust Rules” that may be used to sort and
categorize keys automatically without user interaction. “Trust Rules” are
also capable of integrating key revocation status into its calculations so it too
is automated. This thesis presents that conditional trust established through
“Trust Rules” can enforce stricter security while reducing the burden of use
and automating the process of key validity, trust, and revocation.
2 Introduction:
This thesis wishes to develop a new trust model for OpenPGP encryption.
The current 4880 RFC [4] that describes OpenPGP allows for two types
of trust models: a three-tiered hierarchy certificate authority, PKI type of
structure, and a “Web of Trust” [48]. Each of these models either depends
on a group to establish trust or a trusted introducer, but neither establish
conditional rules for trust establishment. Such conditional rules would al-
low key validity to be based on particular user-established conditions being
satisfied. This thesis develops a system that uses user-developed rules to con-
ditionally assign trust to OpenPGP keys. These “Trust Rules” allow users
to develop stricter validation rules based specifically on their own criteria,
thereby increasing their security and confidence in the use of OpenPGP. For
1
example, a person could establish that a key is only valid if it is signed by
two or more keys from a group of 5 keys, which are explicitly chosen by the
end user. Many different trust models could be developed if a rule-based con-
ditional trust model were established. This model would allow each group
or individual to create their own “Trust Rules” to establish trust and key
validity.
Additionally, with recent high profile compromises of certification author-
ities [40], such as DigiNotar, certification authorities issuing certificates for
the purpose of man-in-the-middle attacks [40], and the code signing of the
Stuxnet virus [7] [32] we can see how any trusted certification authority or
their associated registration authority can be a single point of failure in the
traditional PKI infrastructure. The use of certification authorities or any
single entity to establish key validity or trust would appear to be very prob-
lematic potentially leaning towards outright distrust. Add to that recent
news reports of National Security Agency (NSA) data collection [18] [19] [17]
[43] and one can quickly see the potential need for encryption and potentially
even a distrust towards established cloud services, email provides, and social
networks.
3 History & Terminology:
In this next section we will outline the history associated with our thesis
topic and some terminology will be explained. Before we proceed we need to
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establish a base line of terminology. We will try to use already established
definitions and terms when and where possible.
3.1 Public Key Infrastructure:
The modern Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that we know now started
out in 1988 with the first edition of standards being published. These were
published by the International Organization for Standardization and Inter-
national Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) as ISO/IEC 9594:1990 and
also by the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
(CCITT), now known as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
published as ITU-T X.500 (1988) Series of Recommendations. These stan-
dards set forth an electronic directory service to be used as a general-purpose
directory store of information. Employee information such as phone num-
bers, office numbers, email, certificates, and other information could be stored
within the directory. There have been 5 editions of the standards with the
5th being published as ISO/IEC 9594:2005 and ITU-T X.500 (2005)[27].
Within the standard are the documents ISO/IEC 9594-8 and ITU-T
X.509 [29] which respectively outline the use of “Public-Key and Attribute
Certificate Frameworks” (called “Authentication Framework” before 4th edi-
tion). These documents along with The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) Request for Comment (RFC) RFCs 3280 [23], 4325 [41], 4630 [24],
are what define the format and structure of the Public Key Infrastructure.
The IETF goal is to “...develop a profile to facilitate the use of X.509 cer-
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tificates within Internet applications for those communities wishing to make
use of X.509 technology. Such applications may include WWW, electronic
mail, user authentication, and IPsec” [23].
Many people use the Public Key Infrastructure everyday without ever
giving it any thought. This lack of thought was a goal of the IETF when
they described the respective RFCs. The procedures, protocols, and policies
are designed so that the user has minimal interaction with PKI. The general
public’s exposure to most PKI is through the utilization of Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) communication to buy products online through retail websites
or check email. A lesser few use PKI to authenticate and login to VPNs,
workstations, and other enterprise systems. These SSL connections and PKI
authentications are secured with X.509 Certificates, signed by digital signa-
tures and issued by Certificate Authorities (CAs) such as Verisign or other
trusted CAs.
This thesis will examine the following X.509 aspects: X.509 Certificates,
Certification Authority, and Certificate Revocation Lists.
3.2 X.509 Certificates:
A X.509 Certificate, as defined in RFC 3280 [23], has the following fields:
signatureAlgorithm, signatureValue, version, serialNumber, signature, issuer,
validity, subject, subjectPublicKeyInfo, uniqueIdentifier, extensions. Each of
these values may be a sequence of values which describes attributes associated
with that field.
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• signatureAlgorithm specifies the algorithm to use in calculating the
signature.
• signatureValue is the actual value of the certificate signature.
• version specifies what version number of X.509 this certificate belongs.
• serialNumber is the unique number assigned to the certificate by the
certificate authority (CA).
• signature specifies the algorithm to use in calculating the signature.
MUST be the same as signatureAlorithm.
• issuer is who issued the certificate as a X.501 Name Type.
• validity is the date in which the certificate is valid.
• subject identifies to whom the certificate has been issued.
• subjectPublicKeyInfo holds the public key of the subject.
• uniqueIdentifier is a unique number used to provide uniqueness if a
subjects name is reused.
• extensions provide a mechanism to associate additional attributes
with certificates.
The X.509 Certificate binds the public key of a user or system to the iden-
tifying information within the certificate by being digitally signed by a Cer-
tification Authority. This digital signature ensures that no tampering of the
5
certificate is possible, because only the issuing CA will have the correspond-
ing private key that was used to sign the X.509 Certificate.
3.3 Certification Authority:
A Certification Authority (CA), also referred to as a Certificate Authority, is
a trusted source that issues public-key certificates. It does this by digitally
signing public keys and relevant identifying information, such as the subject,
subjectPublicKeyInfo, and other X.509 Certificate fields. The information
held within the certificate is thereby bound to the respective private key of
the subject. The digital signature reliably prevents tampering of the public-
key certificate because only the CA may alter the data as it alone has the
corresponding private key. Once public-key certificates are issued they may
be publicly distributed freely or published in an electronic directory service
ie: X.500.
There are two important criteria for Certification Authorities to evaluate
before issuing a public-key certificate. These have been defined in the X509
Recommendations [29] as follows:
• A certification authority shall be satisfied of the identity of a user before
creating a certificate for it.
• A certification authority shall not issue certificates for two users with
the same name.
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To facility these requirements the CA must take precautions to prevent fal-
sifications of identity, public key information, and resolve duplicate names.
The first requirement can easily be satisfied given enough information can
be confirmed by the certification authority. Common forms of identity such
as a government issued photo identification card and/or Passport may be
used to confirm ones identity. For web based entities, such as a Web Server,
ownership of the web servers domain name may be established before issuing
a certificate. For both end user and web server certificates the public key
information needs to be securely transmitted to the certificate authority. If
this is not done the certification authority may end up signing the wrong
public key. If this occurs the web server or user might not be able to read
any secure communications and it could allow an attacker to read all of the
communications that were thought to be secure.
The second requirement ensures that no user can pose as another user by
duplicating the name. The name or subject field of a public-key certificate
(X.509) holds a distinguished name that identifies the entity. A distinguished
name is defined in X.501 [28] as “... that name which consists of the sequence
of the relative distinguished name of the entry which represents the object
and those of all of its superior entries (in descending order).”
As an example, the subject (Distinguished name) of the certificate is-
sued to ipay.rit.edu is: “C = US, ST = New York, L = Rochester, O =
Rochester Institute of Technology, OU = Information Technology Services,
CN = ipay.rit.edu” This can easily make sense when it is known that C=
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Country, ST= State, L= Location, O= Organization, OU= Organizational
Unit, CN= Common Name. The distinguished name (DN) tells us the loca-
tion and entity that requested the certificate. The final Common Name must
match the domain name or (URl) of the web server that is being visited, in
this case ipay.rit.edu.
3.4 Certificate Revocation List:
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) provide a way for a Certification Au-
thority to revoke a public-key certificates. These CRLs are established as
endpoints via http, ldap, or other network communication specifications to
update end users of the status of a public-key certificate. Certificates nor-
mally have an expiration date after which they are no longer valid, but if a
certificate needs to be revoked for another reason the Certification Authority
may use the CRL to do so.
There are a few reasons why a Certification Authority may need to re-
voke a certificate. A Certification Authority may revoke for the following
reasons: The user’s private key may be compromised, the user is no longer
certified by the authority, or the certification authority’s certificate has been
compromised. Each of the following cases would lead to a Certificate Revo-
cation List being updated with the relevant public-key certificate identified
as revoked or invalid.
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3.5 PGP:
“Pretty Good Privacy” (PGP) was written by Philip Zimmermann in 1991
[47] [48]. The history of PGP is well known and can be explored more thor-
oughly by the reader in Michael W. Lucas’s book “PGP & GPG: Email for
the Practical Paranoid” [33] or from Phil Zimmermann’s direct accounts in
“Why I wrote PGP” [47]. The short version of the history is that Mr. Zim-
mermann wanted to allow individuals to send communications and exchanges
securely via encryption without the possibility of government mandated back
doors or key escrows. PGP allows any person the ability to send email or
other communications knowing that the only person able to read the com-
munique would be the addressed recipient.
For our purposes it is noteworthy to know the differences between PGP,
GPG, and OpenPGP. PGP or “Pretty Good Privacy” is the original specifica-
tion as developed by Phil Zimmermann, which later established the PGP Cor-
poration. Referring to PGP should be taken as talking about PGP the cor-
poration, however many use it interchangeably with the RFC or OpenPGP.
GPG or “Gnu Privacy Guard” is a software package that reimplements the
PGP standard and later, when developed, the OpenPGP standard. Finally,
OpenPGP is the RFC standard that GPG and PGP software implement
enabling them to be OpenPGP compliant.
The OpenPGP standard is defined in RFC 4880 [4] and previously in
RFC 2440 [5] & RFC 1991 [2]. This standard defines how all OpenPGP
clients should format, process and communicate OpenPGP messages.
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The OpenPGP specification differs from the X509 specification in many
ways. The key specification, trust model, allowed algorithms all have differ-
ent options and specifications. For this thesis the major differences should
be noted through the use of different trust models and key verification of
trust. OpenPGP uses a “Web of Trust” versus X.509’s hierarchical tree
model. OpenPGP more recently has extended its specification to include a
hierarchical trust model, but the “Web of Trust” is probably the most used
trust model with OpenPGP. The “Web of Trust” consists of every individ-
ual who uses the OpenPGP standard regardless of software package. These
users make up the web and form connections or edges of the web by digitally
signing other users OpenPGP keys. Each user then may elect to trust some
other user’s digital signature for verification of the public-key certificate or
key of a third user. This OpenPGP trust takes place instead of implementing
X.509 Certification Authorities. Each user may act as their own Certifica-
tion Authority. A user’s verification and certification of other’s keys may be
extended to others that trust them. With all users certifying OpenPGP keys
it creates a graph or web of trust connections between all users.
3.6 OpenPGP Format:
An OpenPGP message or certificate is constructed from a number of records
or entries that are called packets. These packets should not be confused
with network packets or other types of packets. These OpenPGP packets are
chunks of data that are tagged with specific meaning. The following are the
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types of OpenPGP packets according to RFC 4880 [4]:
• Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets
• Signature Packet
• Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets
• One-Pass Signature Packets
• Key Material Packet
• Compressed Data Packet
• Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet
• Marker Packet
• Literal Data Packet
• Trust Packet
• User ID Packet
• User Attribute Packet
• Symmetric Encrypted Integrity Protected Data Packet
• Modification Detection Code Packet
An OpenPGP message, keyring, certificate, or other types of OpenPGP
objects are made up of these packets. Packets may hold other OpenPGP
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packets, also known as subpackets, within. Some packets are never to be
exchanged with other users, but are only for internal software data stores
e.g. Trust Packets. Each packet is made up of a packet header followed
by the packet body. Not all combinations of OpenPGP packets form valid
objects. Some packets may be included multiple times where as others can
only be included once and must be the last packet in the series, e.g. the
Modification Detection packet. Finally, some packets may be digitally signed
by the private key of the user to bind the packet data held within said packet
to the users key, there by establishing a trusted connection to the signed
packet.
Next, this thesis will describe a selection of OpenPGP packets that are
of particular interest in regards to this thesis and will explore their workings
and format.
3.6.1 Key Material Packet:
The Key Material Packet contains the actual key material, private or a public
key, depending on the type of Key Material Packet. There are four variants
of Key Material Packets which are:
Public-Key Packet: Format Described below.
Public-Subkey Packet: Public-Subkey Packet has the exact same format
as a Public-Key packet, but describes a subkey.
Secret-Key Packet: A Secret-Key packet contains all the information as
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described in a Public-Key packet, including the public-key material,
but also includes the secret-key material appended at the end of all the
public-key fields.
Secret-Subkey Packet: Secret-Subkey Packet has the exact same format
as a Secret-Key packet, but describes a subkey.
The preceding Key Material Packets depend on the structure of the
Public-Key Packet so, this thesis will explore its format and use. The format
of a version 4 Public-Key OpenPGP packet [4], contains :
• A one-octet version number (4).
• A four-octet number denoting the time that the key was created.
• A one-octet number denoting the public-key algorithm of this key.
• A series of multiprecision integers comprising the key material.
By utilizing the four types of packets previously mentioned OpenPGP
creates keys and subkeys. These subkeys are signed by the primary key
or primary user identity to establish a trust relationship between them. A
user of OpenPGP can utilize subkeys to increase their security. By using
subkeys it allows a person to keep their primary key in a secure location
and use subkeys in insecure locations. These subkeys may be revoked, if
compromised, by the primary key. It is then possible to have multiple subkeys
in multiple locations all used independently of each other, but tied together
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in common by the primary key. The user is guaranteed that no adversary
can sign keys or establish new subkeys as the primary key would be required.
It should be noted that the use of more than one encryption subkey would be
problematic as the sender of an encrypted communique would have to pick
the correct subkey needed for encryption. For this reason it is advised to only
use one encryption subkey at a time, but you may produce new encryption
keys at any interval that you wish. If a subkey is ever compromised the user
can revoke the subkey and still retain any collected digital signatures on the
primary key. Again, despite using different keys the recipient of a message
can establish a trust path to the subkey by verifying that the digital signature
on the subkey matches with the primary key.
3.6.2 Signature Packet:
A Signature packet associates a public key with some data via a digital
signature thereby binding the data to the public key. The most common
signature type is a signature on a file, a block of text, or a signature that is
used to certify a User ID. The signatures on User IDs are what make up the
“Web of Trust” within OpenPGP. Signatures on text are used to verify the
sending origin of a message and provide modification protection. The body
of a version 4 Signature packet contains:
• One-octet version number (4).
• One-octet signature type.
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• One-octet public-key algorithm.
• One-octet hash algorithm.
• Two-octet scalar octet count for following hashed subpacket data.
• Hashed subpacket data set (zero or more subpackets).
• Two-octet scalar octet count for the following unhashed subpacket data.
• Unhashed subpacket data set (zero or more subpackets).
• Two-octet field holding the left 16 bits of the signed hash value.
• One or more multiprecision integers comprising the signature.
There are 26 Signature Packet subpackets that assert different informa-
tion about an OpenPGP key attribute or the signature packet itself. Sub-
packets are made up of objects like Signature Creation Time, Key Expiration
Time, Trust Signature, Signer’s User ID, Key Server Preferences, Preferred
Key Server, and Reason for Revocation just to name a few. This thesis will
next examine a handful of signature subpackets.
3.6.3 Trust Signature:
Just as in a more traditional PKI structure OpenPGP allows for a Certifi-
cation Authority type structure through the use of “Trusted Introducers.”
These trusted entities operate in much the same manner as a regular Certi-
fication Authority by verifying the identity of the person or entity. Unlike
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X.509 Certification Authorities, however, the trusted introducer does not
create an X509 Certificate for the entity, but produces an OpenPGP Signa-
ture packet with a Trust Signature subpacket. When others encounter an
OpenPGP key signed by the trusted entity they assume the OpenPGP key
is valid even if they have not verified this to be true themselves.
A Trust Signature packet is very simple, it has one octet which describes
the “level” (depth) and one octet which describes the amount of trust. The
signer uses the Trust Signature to assert the trustworthiness of another at
a specified level. Level 0 has the same meaning as an ordinary validity
signature. Level 1 means that the signed key is certified to be a trusted
introducer, with the 2nd octet specifying the degree of trust. Level 2 means
that the signed key can be trusted to issue level 1 trust signatures. This
continues on as higher levels are introduced, with a level N trust signature
asserting that a key is trusted to issue level N-1 trust signatures. The trust
amount is an integer from 0-255 and is interpreted so that values less than 120
indicate partial trust and values greater than 120 indicate complete trust. In
actuality, when implementing the OpenPGP specification most applications
produce values of 60 for partial trust and 120 for complete trust.
So, with the introduction of Trust Signatures it is possible to create a PKI
structure by first creating a OpenPGP key (A) that is a “Trusted Introducer”
of level 2 signatures and completely trusted. Then, use key (A) to create 3
new OpenPGP keys (B, C, D) with Trust Signatures of level 1 and completely
trusted. Now, B,C, and D may sign end users keys and if a user trusts the
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original OpenPGP key A, they will also accept signatures from B, C, and D
as valid and thereby trust any key that B, C, and D have certified.
3.6.4 Preferred Key Server:
Like X.509 Certificates OpenPGP keys may be stored in online directory
stores or Key Server as they are called with OpenPGP. There are many
key servers throughout the world, so if a user has a particular favorite or
preference in which key server they would like to use they may signify this
by using a Preferred Key Server sub packet signature. Like other sub packets
the Preferred Key Server packet attaches an attribute to the OpenPGP key.
The Preferred Key Server contains only one field which is a string in the form
of a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This URI denotes the key server that
the user prefers be used by others for updates. Keys with multiple User IDs
may have a preferred key server for each User ID. Other users update a key
by introducing Trust Signatures or other types of signature packets upon a
key. These new signatures need to be distributed to others via the key server.
Without an update mechanism the new signatures could not be distributed
and used to recalculate the “Web of Trust” by adding new signatures or
edges.
3.6.5 Key revocation:
As mentioned previously OpenPGP keys may be revoked by their owners.
This revocation is established by a revocation signature on the key being
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revoked. This revocation can happen for a number of reasons and is denoted
by the “Reason for Revocation” signature subkey. The Reason for Revocation
subkey begins with one octet containing the reason for revocation followed
by a string specifying the reason. The first field has the following format.
• 0 - No reason specified
• 1 - Key is superseded
• 2 - Key material has been compromised
• 3 - Key is retired and no longer used
• 32 - User ID information is no longer valid
• 100-110 - Private Use
It should also be noted that signatures as well as keys may be revoked.
Signatures made on another person’s key may be revoked by the signatory at
anytime. Like key revocation revoked signatures carry a reason for revocation
as well.
4 Literature Review:
In this section this thesis will look at previous research on the topic of encryp-
tion, OpenPGP, User Interface design in encryption software, Trust model,
and new encryption protocols. In evaluating OpenPGP and other encryption
schemes there seems to be two major approaches.
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1. Improving End-user software ease of use.
2. Improving protocol mechanisms and architecture.
With our approach this thesis presents a mix of both ease of use and mech-
anisms. This thesis has defined a new trust model which would need ap-
plication component development and integration. And at the same time
this thesis has carefully tried to keep from defining an entire new protocol
and have worked within the OpenPGP specifications [4]. Our trust model
has incorporated current research and ideas on establishing trust. As well as
how trust is involved with software trust calculations, which this thesis will
examine in more detail. As stated previously this thesis does not wish to
change the OpenPGP message format [4], but only change how the trust is
calculated internally in software packages.
4.1 Ease of Use:
OpenPGP is an open standard, as documented in RFC [4], however there are
many implementations of that standard in software. PGP software is the old-
est of such software. PGP’s software shortcomings have been well established
in the review of PGP 5.0 titled “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability
Evaluation of PGP 5.0” by Whitten and Tygar [45]. The researchers start
with a premise that 90% of all security failures are based on configuration
errors. Also, that software security user interface standards must be held to
a higher standard than traditional non-security related software. This higher
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standard should be used to prevent end users from entering security config-
uration errors. They suggest that security user interface requirements are
such that there is a need to develop domain specific standards. The usability
standards for normal software are not sufficient for security products. They
defined usable security software as usable ”...if the people who are expected
to use it:
1. are reliably made aware of the security tasks they need to perform;
2. are able to figure out how to successfully perform those tasks;
3. don’t make dangerous errors;
4. are sufficiently comfortable with the interface to continue using it.”
To evaluate their hypothesis they used two separate evaluation methods.
The first was a direct analysis method called cognitive walkthrough, and the
second a laboratory user test.
In a cognitive walkthrough the researchers try to evaluate the software
from the standpoint of a “novice” user. With this in mind they evaluate the
learnability of the software. Through a cognitive walkthrough Whitten and
Tygar identified numerous design issues and improvements for PGP 5.0. The
design issues are identified as Visual Metaphors, Key Servers, Key Manage-
ment Policy, Irreversible Actions, Consistency, and Too much Information.
Visual Metaphors has to do with the use of images or icons to denote end user
operations. In using Visual Metaphors a software developer should be careful
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to avoid introducing confusion by not fully realizing how an image or icon
may be perceived by the end user. Care should be taken to adjust images to
accurately depict the operations. When using Key Servers they felt the user
needed to be more informed about how the operation was taking place. The
lack of a Visual Metaphor for this operation left users unaware of operations
taking place on remote servers versus their local computers. Accordingly
they felt the user interface of PGP 5.0 did not make this clear. Further,
the Key Management Policy was not identified within the user interface, but
only was available through the users manual. They note that “validity” and
“trust” are shown to the user, but their meanings are not made obvious to
the user. Next, Irreversible Actions need to be properly identified to the
user. Irreversible actions are those that if taken by a user will not be able
to reconstructed after their affects have taken place. These actions include
things such as: Deleting the private key, accidentally publicizing a key, and
accidentally revoking a key. Consistency within the software should be kept
to create a clear mental picture. The use of ”encryption” and ”encoding”
should not be interchanged, as PGP 5.0 does. The substitution of such words
may confuse the end user as to what really is happening. Finally, according
to Whitten and Tygar, PGP 5.0 displays too much information. They would
reduce the amount of information that is displayed by default to the user.
They suggest hiding fields such as the Key Length and Key Creation Time
from users, but display this information via a properties page. Their reason-
ing is that more advance users will seek out this information if they need it,
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but it confuses novice users.
For the laboratory user test Whitten and Tygar setup a scenarios in which
the test subject is a member of a political campaign. For reasons of security,
communications are secured with PGP encryption and digitally signed. Test
subjects were then given a task of emailing a proposed itinerary for their can-
didate to the campaign manager and fourth other team members. This task
would require the test subject to perform the following operations: Gener-
ate a Key Pair, acquire the team member’s public keys, publish their public
key, sign the itinerary, encrypt the itinerary to the recipients of the email,
and finally send the email. During this test limited interaction was allowed
between the test subject and the monitor, however the monitor did provide
informative replies via email posing as the campaign manager and other po-
litical volunteers. There were widespread problems with the test subjects as
they tried to complete their given task. Many could not create keys, send,
or verify encrypted email within a 90 minute deadline. Three participants
actually emailed the secret itinerary in plaintext without encryption. Many
participants in the research were confused and unable to send, sign, and/or
encrypted email to the research conductors. In fact one person was so con-
fused as the nature of OpenPGP that they create public/private keys for each
individual they wished to communication with. Based on the user test, the
researchers felt that it supports their theory that the user interface design
for PGP 5.0 is not usable for people who do not already have knowledge of
PGP.
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Whitten and Tygar make the following suggestion for an improvement
over current security user interface design. Establish a clear and accurate
conceptual model of the security to the user as quickly as possible. They
express the need for the model to be as small as possible to allow for quick
and accurate integration by the user while maintaining security. They suggest
that through the use of appropriate visual metaphors, warning messages,
wizards and other interactive tools that one would be able to increase user
understanding and use of security software. The exact use and design of such
an interface has been left open for future research.
The short comings of encryption software continued to be evaluated by
Garfinkel and Miller, but this time with newer software and protocols, such
as Outlook and S/MIME [15]. In “Johnny 2: A User Test of Key Continuity
Management with S/MIME and Outlook Express” they present the user
testing of Key Continuity Management (KCM). KCM ignores the standard
X.509 certificate chain, instead it uses only the public key to identify email
from each sender. The use of only a public key with no certificate chain
is similar to the operation of SSH. The server information is cached on the
first connection and is then verified on each subsequent connection. KCM
follows this paradigm by caching S/MIME certificates and associating the
originating email with that certificate when first received and then uses it
on each subsequent email sent and received there after. The authors note
that this system is not as secure as having a third party certificate authority,
nor does it establish a responsible party for policy violations. Given these
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short comings however, they express hope in KCM’s increased likelihood of
adoption and its ability to scale to multiple organizations.
Garfinkel & Miller’s study is a continuation on the work done by Whitten
and Tygar [45] with what they call a “radical reinterpretation” of the results.
Garfinkel & Miller put forth that the key certification model used by PGP
was the underlying problem in Whitten and Tygar’s research, not PGP 5.0 or
user training. To remedy the problem Garfinkel and Miller used KCM and
tried to mimic Whitten and Tygar’s research method for their laboratory
user tests. In Garfinkel & Miller’s user tests they introduce attacks on KCM
into the scenario to test how the users respond.
With the introduction of KCM the authors also described a new user
interface that would allow key continuity to be displayed to the user via
different background colors. They described a system that would display
a green border around messages that have a good signature from a person
known to use signatures. The border would be displayed as gray if an email
is received from a person that normally signs their emails. A yellow border
is shown when a new signature and a new email are recognized. Lastly, a
red border is shown when an email is received from a known sender with a
signature that does not match the one recorded.
The subjects of the user test were divided into three categories: No KCM,
Color, and Color+Briefing. The No KCM group had the KCM system dis-
abled and a gray border around all messages. The Color group had the KCM
enabled as normal. And the Color+Briefing group had the KCM enabled as
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normal and received an additional briefing. Using the No KCM as a baseline
the researchers then show the improvement of KCM against three different
kinds of attacks. They were called the “New Key Attack”, the “New Identity
Attack” and the “Unsigned Message Attack”. The “New Key Attack” tried
to introduce a new key for an already established email identity (Certificate
and Email pair). The “New Identity Attack” tried to establish a new iden-
tity for a known person using a new email address and subsequently a new
certificate. The “Unsigned Message Attack” attempted to entice the user to
respond to an unsigned email for a known identity.
The results of the tests showed that KCM users were much better at
identifying the “New Key Attack” versus the No KCM group with a dramatic
improvement shown in the Color+Briefing group. In the “New Key Attack”
the researchers sent an attack email for a known good email, but with a new
key. This message was then colored red by the KCM. For the “New Identity
Attack” KCM did not show significant improvement over the No KCM test
group. For the “New Identity Attack” the researchers used an attacker email
that was established via Hotmail and was misspelled. KCM identified this
message with a yellow border. Despite these clues to possible attack many
test subjects rationalized that the key and the email address were different
because a home computer was being used. Only two subjects were identified
as noticing the misspelling of the name, and only one of them used this
information to confirm their decision to not send secret information to the
attacker. Finally, the “Unsigned Message Attack” KCM was a “success” for
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both the Color group and the Color+Briefing group. However, in follow-up
interviews it was found that most test subjects did not use KCM as much
to identify the possible attack, as they did the requested recipient’s email
address. The email address for the attack was a Hotmail address. Many of
the test subjects did not trust the security of Hotmail, thus the NO KCM
group was not as susceptible to this attack as the researchers initially thought.
Garfinkel & Miller conclude that KCM could improve security but is not
the silver bullet for the email security problem. There remains the open
question regarding establishment of identity trust relationships, to which
KCM does not provide a solution. However, the authors feel that KCM adds
to the development of technologies that could be implemented to secure email
and provide for more widespread adoption of S/MIME.
The use of visual cues in security software has continued to be researched
by Kapadia [31]. Kapadia identified how the use of visual cues to denote se-
curity can be beneficial or a threat to security. In the research on these visual
cues it was outlined how an attacker might be able to exploit the relationship
or lack of with regards to key trust. Kapadia outlined how an attacker could
get a trusted third party to verify their key, then proceed to communicate
with the victim, the victim may assume that the communication is secured
via strongly trusted certification authorities, but when in fact they have third
party CAs. Since, clients do not display the certification authority by default
the victim has no way of knowing that the attacker is not using a strongly
trusted authority. Kapadia, in this case was arguing for more verification
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of third party CAs as well as pointing out a possible security flaw. In our
system the Tagged keys are separated from the Trusted keys, and Tagged
Keys show the Trust Rules that triggered them. These rules should allow
our system to not succumb to the attack depicted by Kapadia. The end user
should notice that the Trust Rule did not trigger the same rule as the rest
of the group/community if even at all. The hope would be that an end user
would notice the different tags that were assigned and then inquire as to why
key X does not trigger the group’s previously establish Trust Rules.
In another paper by Garfinkel [14] visual references were noted as helping
end users and a comparison of different email clients and their interfaces was
conducted. Garfinkel showed how users of AOL email can visually identify
email sent within the network versus email that originated outside of the
AOL network. This difference provides the user with clues that the origin of
the email has been authenticated. Garfinkel also identified Outlook’s small
certificate and Apple’s Mail Security header as reasons that allow easier use
of S/MIME or X.509 Certificates. This thesis will explore further research
into the use of Trust Rules in an email client in Section 7 on Future Research.
4.2 Trust Models:
In developing our Trust Model and our associated Trust Rules research on
Trust Models was evaluated. The research on Trust Models mainly described
new mechanism or protocols to exchange and establish trust.
Our primary Trust Rule described establishes that an individual trusts
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at least K authentication servers or Certificates Authorities will be truthful
out of N servers was described by Chen [6]. In the paper Chen described
a situation where you may only minimally trust a group of authentication
servers, but you trust that at least N servers will be truthful. Chen then
established a protocol to exchange this trust between users and servers. In-
stead of establishing new protocols this thesis would use PGP signatures as
an exchange mechanism.
Many trust models focus on distributed protocols in establishing their
community. These distributed models rely on the end points to establish
trust without the need for a central server. This kind of distributed trust
was also described by Adbul-Rahman [1], but in developing their trust mech-
anism they used a recommendation protocol. Abdul-Rahman suggested a
new recommendation protocol separate from trust calculations. This thesis
does not wish to develop a new protocol to establish trust, as this thesis feels
signatures are sufficient to denote a recommendation of trust and/or validity.
In considering distributed trust mechanisms some have looked to the com-
munities rather than the end users to establish this trust. This segmentation
of peers into communities was described by Ravichandran [38]. Ravichandran
specifically studied peer-to-peer interactions, reputation systems, delegation,
and proposed a new “Eigen Group Trust” model as an improvement over
Eigen Trust. In Eigen trust [30], a peer would calculate the global trust value
by obtaining reputation values from all peers in the network, but Ravichan-
dran segments the network into groups before calculating trust. By using
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“Eigen Group Trust” it reduces the calculations and removes the require-
ment that the user have a global view of the network before calculating trust
relationships. Our trust model can introduce similar ideas by exchanging
Trust Rules between communities and groups. While one can not export the
trust or signatures that Trust Rules have established there is nothing that
prevents one from distributing the Trust Rules themselves. The Trust Rules
can be formed and discussed among a community as to what the best or
most secure rule set should be. Once in agreement the Trust Rules could be
distributed to the members. These Trust Rules while developed by the group
community still rely on the end user to implement. One could conceive of
rules being established between different groups and communities that would
allow for interchange of keys and trust.
While many of the former research has looked into trust and its distribu-
tion, distrust is as equally important. The distribution of trust and distrust
was studied in Guha’s paper on ”Propagation of Trust and Distrust” [20].
The paper’s goal ”is to propose and analyze algorithms for implementing”
a web of trust at the micro (single website) or macro level (entire inter-
net). Guha puts forth that their work is the first to incorporate distrust
into computational trust propagations. Firstly, they formalize the math-
ematical algorithms for trust propagation, such as direct propagation, co-
citation, transpose trust, and trust coupling. Secondly, then turn to distrust
propagation methodologies, identifying; Trust only, One-step distrust, and
propagated distrust. Thirdly, they look at two different iterative propaga-
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tion algorithms; Eigen Trust [30] and Weighted linear combinations (WLC).
Fourthly, they turn to different types of rounding, since we will establish a
boolean outcome from trust graph established utilizing real number value
pairs for trust/distrust. From the trust algorithms, the iteration method,
distrust propagation, and rounding cases (three each) there results in 34 =
81 experimental schemes to evaluate. Finally, utilizing the Epinion’s website
dataset Guha sets about to analyze each of the experimental schemes to see
which one best predicts the trust or distrust between nodes in the epionion’s
dataset. The best performing results were seen from the one step distrust
with Eigen Trust [30] iterations.
In establishing trust we need to ensure that we have identified the correct
individual or entity. Cheng’s research [8] is focused on the sybil attack.
The Sybil attack was formerly known as ”pseudospoofing” is the process of
creating multiple identities or pseudonyms by on entity. The term ”sybil”
was introduced by John Douceur [12] and based on the book [42] after the
same name which is about the treatment of Sybil Dorsett who suffered from
multiple personality disorder, now known as dissociative identity disorder.
Cheng presents the notion of what constitutes sybilproofness and considers
how to prevent falsely raising ones reputation utilizing fake links between
sybils. Cheng does not address ”badmouthing” or the case in which sybils
are used to degrade the reputation of other non-sybil nodes, however they




The distribution of trust and delegation of duties can allow for credibility and
reputation in a small group to then be extended further as the interconnects
to other communities are established. Group dynamics and reputation in
an online community have been studied by Resnick [39] in evaluating eBay’s
reputation system. Resnick identified three criteria for reputation systems:
1. Provide information that allows participants to distinguish between
trustworthy and non-trustworthy agents.
2. Encourage participants to be trustworthy.
3. Discourage participation from those who are not trustworthy.
The first criteria is satisfied with OpenPGP participants recognizing trust-
worthy agents through the signatures on the agents key in question. A non
trustworthy individual should not be able to obtain key signatures from other
people or trusted third parties. The second criteria is enforced by each end
user refusing to communicate with a key of unknown trustworthiness or va-
lidity. Without manual verification or other signatures on said key the user
has no way of knowing the key holders identity is truthful and correct. The
third criteria is satisfied when a user revokes their signature from a users
key. The possibility of key signature revocation should persuade individuals
to continue to act in a trustworthy manner.
Group dynamics and reputation have also been studied by Huynh [25]
in which “Certified Reputation” was described as a new form of third-party
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certification of reputation. This thesis present the use signatures by group
members as a form of reputation or certification, since key validity could
have been already established through the use of Trust Rules. If a member
of the group has turned out to become untrustworthy members could revoke
their signatures, and then if a user re-enters the group members may re-sign
that members key.
It would also be permissible to establish a separate revocation mechanism
as defined by the group into the Trust Rule. This trust revocation could
be by the initial certifying parties, the key holder, or another third-party
that is strictly for key revocations. When developing the Trust Rule for the
community it can be decided that any user that is found untrustworthy will
have their key signed by the communities revocation keys. To prevent undue
revocation by the group it is possible to establish a group of keys that must
be a part of the signature before complete revocation takes place. The use of
K of N total signatures for revocation can be used just the same as when the
certifying Trust Rule was developed and may in fact be incorporated into the
Trust Rule itself by placing a NOT around the revocation signatures. The
negation will allow the Trust Rule to succeed only if the revocation keys are
not present. This is the opposite of normal trust evaluations, but can be
accomplished using the NOT operator. This type of revocation status being
incorporated into the trust metric was outlined by Bicakci [3].
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4.4 OpenPGP Web of Trust Analysis:
The original analysis of the Web of Trust was done in 1996 by Neal McBurnett
[35] shortly after the creation of OpenPGP. He subsequently updated his
findings in 1997 as the Web of Trust grew [34]. In 1996 he found that there
were 2047 keys in the ’Strongly Connected’ set of keys or strong set. That is
to say, keys which have a path connecting them to every other key in the set.
These paths are established by key signatures and do not take into account
any type of trust modeling. In 1997 the strong set included 3100 keys. After
identifying the largest strong set of OpenPGP keys he analyzed the distance
or number of hops which separate each key. This would be the degree in
network graph theory terminology. The mean shortest distance (MSD) was
calculated to be 5.98188 in 1996 and 6.061 in 1997. The maximum shortest
path in 1996 and 1997 was 21. McBurnett also created a listing of keys within
the strong set sorted by MSD. An interesting note, is that this analysis only
took 30 minutes on a Sun Sparc 1000.
Analysis continued in 2001 by Drew Streib [44] however the website is
no longer available, but was able to be accessed by the Internet Archive
Wayback Machine [11]. Streib analyzed 1,461,786 keys and found the strong
set to be 10,828 keys strong. The average MSD was calculated at 6.6741.
Streib continue the analysis until April 2002 when there was 1,945,876,437
keys total and 12,285 keys in the strong set. The source code used to do the
analysis, keyanalyze, was released under GPL open source terms.
Drew Streib’s research points to more resent research by Jason Harris [22]
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utilizing the keyanalyze source code, however again the website is offline and
this time the Internet Archive does not have any useful records.
In 2004, Jrgen Cederlf conducted more research and analysis of the web
of trust, but this time it was more graphical [?]. Cederlf graphed the web of
trust as a group matrix such that, ”A dot in column x, counting from left,
and row y, counting from the top, means that key number x has signed key
number y. A red dot means a signature of level 0 or 1, a blue dot level 2
and a green level 3. Signatures which are not on the primary User ID are
represented by a darker dot.” The image generated appear as a leaf when
keys are sorted by MSD and can be seen in figure 1.
Henk P. Penning continued the analysis, which continues today, and is
probably the most complete with many interesting graphs [36]. The most
recent graphs have been included in appendix A.10. While unclear when the
research began, the graphs present data from 2003 to current. All recent
data shows that the strong set is growing and that the MSD to all keys is
decreasing. The strong set contains approximately 50,000 keys. The number
one ranked key, Peter Palfrader, has a MSD of 3.5832. One interesting piece
of data from Penning’s research is the average degree or signatures per key
within the strong set is approximately 10. That means that the average user
has, on average, 10 signatures. There are of course many users which have
hundreds of signatures which then act as trust anchors
Penning’s graphs were updated with an idea from Matthew Wilcox to
use the data from Streib and Harris and graph the data over time. These
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Figure 1: OpenPGP Keys graphed as matrix, sorted by MSD.
graphs were similar to a stock index or NASDAQ or if your from the UK,
the FTSE 100, commonly called the Footsie. The footsie graphs by Wilcox
showed the change in strong set over time and the change in top 50 keys,
top 1000 keys to name a few data points. The graphs have been included
in appendix A.11. Subsequently penning’s graphs were updated to show the
footsie idea and are also included in appendix A.10.
Our own analysis of the web of trust top 50 keys is included in appendix
A.5. We show the change in the top 50 keys from 2008 to 2013. The top 50
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keys are fairly stable, with the following key statistics: 6% No Change, 22%
New, 28% Upward Moving, 44% Downward Moving. The downward moving
keys are mainly a result of new keys introduced into the top 50. Most of the
old top 50 keys remained in the top 50 even though their place may have
changed. In analyzing the new keys in the top 50 we find that the keys are
vary strongly connected with most keys with over 200 cross signatures.
• AAE6022E, Karlheinz Geyer has 1030 cross signatures.
• BAB58229, Marcus Frings has 526 cross signatures.
• 4743206C, Joachim Breitner has 259 cross signatures.
• 88C7C1F7, Steve McIntyre has 269 cross signatures.
4.5 Miscellaneous Research:
Gutmann [21] conducted a survey in which respondents chose email address,
DNS, or IP address as a better identifier than a X.500 Distinguished Name.
Respondents to the survey selected a repository presence check versus a more
traditional CRL. Respondents also chose HTTP access over LDAP as an
access method. For these reasons and possibly easier application development
this thesis chose OpenPGP. OpenPGP also does not have the rigid structure
associated with its PKI/X.509 counterpart.
In a more recent article [13], Stephen Farrell, suggests that we continue
with our current PKI and not reinvent things until something better comes
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along. He outlines the reinvention and alternatives over the years; incorporat-
ing XML and JSON into PKI, Simple PKI (SPKI), XML Key Management
Specification (XKMS), and DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named
Entities). All of which have yet to replace our X.509 based PKI system. Far-
rel then proceeds to outline two new pieces of technology that he speculates
will allow clients to use their own PKI. First, he calls for a key-registration
service which would register client public keys for authentication to web ser-
vices. Second, a strategy to bind different keys from different devices to the
same user account to allow for device mobility.
In contrast to Perrin’s paper [37] on the use of “cryptoIDs” this thesis
presents that the use of current OpenPGP key fingerprints as a mechanism
to key distribution can be used. Perrin also wished to establish a more long-
lived identifier or “cryptoID” under which public/private key pairs would
be created. This description comes very close to how OpenPGP can create
a long lived parent key with shorter lived subkeys used for encryption and
signing. The user can establish a long lived key through the parent key
and its collected signatures. Perrin used “cryptoIDs” certificates instead of
X.509 or OpenPGP and established their own format. Also, in regards to
fingerprints and hashing mechanisms the particular implementation can be
updated much the same as how the encryption algorithms are updated to
prevent attacks.
Finally, there is a social stigma associated with encryption. Gaw [16] has
studied how many people see encryption and has identified that many see
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it as a burden and for the paranoid. By infusing encryption into a com-
munity and group dynamics this thesis would hope to make it easier and
remove the paranoid stigma attached to using encryption. Through the use
of easier-to-use applications this thesis would remove the burden and extra
steps associated with encryption. This thesis presents a trust model to re-
move some burden in verification of keys through automatic key tagging with
the use of Trust Rules.
5 Description of Trust Model:
In developing a new trust model there are a few requirements that this thesis
wishes to take into consideration. First, the trust model should work with
the current “Web of Trust” OpenPGP model as well as develop its own
mechanism for establishing trust. The Web of Trust has been well established
in user’s minds and is a good model for securely establishing communications.
The end user should maintain their responsibility in establishing how and
who they choose to trust. Second, our new trust model should maintain and,
in most cases, increase security from the Web of Trust model, while being
resilient and resistant to attacks. Third, our new trust model should be easy
for end users to use. Crypto-systems have historically been hard to use, so
this new trust model should be developed with usability in mind.
In addition to the requirements this thesis also has developed this trust
model with the following assumptions.
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1. Trusted Introducer and/or Certification Authorities should not be trusted
solely on their own word, but should be confirmed through others as-
sertions as well.
2. Any single Trusted Introducers and/or Certification Authorities may
make mistakes, can be compromised, or act without regard to a specific
user.
3. The only truly trusted party is that of the end user to which the keyring
belongs– Only that user’s certifications can be fully trusted.
4. Key material will most likely be exposed, compromised, attacked and
will need to be renewed or revoked at some point in the future.
5.1 OpenPGP Integration:
Integration in OpenPGP is a requirement, because it is a well established
crypto-system that many people use for securing their communications. The
likelihood of creating and gathering new users to a new crypto-system would
be problematic and only serve to fracture the crypto-system landscape. By
building on what others have already done this thesis seeks to leverage their
contributions and implement our new trust model within the already estab-
lished protocols. This thesis has already discussed the OpenPGP specifi-
cations with some detail, so it will now focus on what would be needed to
implement the trust model within OpenPGP. This thesis does not wish to
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change the OpenPGP specification nor does it think it is needed. Our cur-
rent trust model can be implemented without changes to the OpenPGP RFC
4880 Standard [4].
5.2 Trust Packets:
OpenPGP RFC 4880 [4] allows for a “Trust Packet” that is used internally
by software implementations. These trust packets should be ignored on input
to programs and also should not be exported as output outside of the local
keyring by programs. By using these packets this thesis presents a new trust
model. This trust model can be developed without fear of users tainting
the current Web of Trust. Additional trust models may be developed by
end users to fit their security requirements. Because the Trust Packets can
not be exported it allows only the current end user to establish trust with
them and allows the program to use these packets for management of our
trust model. The RFC leaves the format of the Trust Packets to the software
package implementation so, this leaves us room to insert our trust model.
This thesis will use the Trust Packet to store a tag or folder marker to
denote which “Trust Rule” was satisfied when the trust calculations were
run. This tag will serve to quickly establish the corresponding Trust Rule
with the key without recalculating its trust. This will serve as a caching
mechanism so that the trust model can safely operate on numerous keys
without overloading the application with new trust calculations. This is not
to say that the tags are cached indefinitely, but only when the program does
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not upload or download new or updated keys. Whenever a key update is
performed by the program key trust calculations must be preformed again
on the updated keys to verify the trust rule corresponding to applied tags
are still valid. For example, if the key has been updated its trust calculations
must be run again to confirm the validity of the tag or tags associated with
it. When keys are updated a key may have been revoked, may contain
more signatures, or signatures may have been revoked on that key by their
signators, so this recalculation of trust rules must take place.
A tag will consist of a Name Field, formatted as string of 255 bytes in
length, plus an ID Field consisting of two octets that will specify the unique
identifier. This ID Field will be used to distinguish the tag on keys and in
Trust Rules. Keys may be tagged by more than one tag at a time with each
tag having its own corresponding Name and ID Fields.
Our Trust Model will use the following format for the The Trust Packet:
• One octet consisting of the version number. (1)
• One octet stating the number, in bytes, of the tag or tags that follow.
• One or more octets consisting of tag IDs.
5.3 Trust Rules:
This thesis will use “Trust Rules” to determine when and if a key should be
trusted. These Trust Rules establish clear rule-based conditions that must
be satisfied for a key to be valid and its identity trusted. This type of trust
41
is different from the trust established in a trusted introducer or a friends
signature on other’s key. Our trust model is only used in confirming trust
in an identity not for calculating or introducing trust to or through others.
All trust calculations using our trust model are kept internal and should not
be the basis for signing another’s key. Key signatures should be evaluated
the same as if using the Web of Trust, in that you manually confirm a key.
The signing of keys should be maintained through the normal methods via
manual verification of key IDs, key fingerprints, government IDs, key signing
parties, etc.
Trust Rules can be thought of as filters or tags that sort email. The Trust
Rules operate on OpenPGP keys and tag them when a rule is satisfied. The
criteria for satisfying a rule can be as simple as a key having a particular
signature to more complex conditional operations. Conditional Trust Rules
may calculate the trust from a group of keys, relative age of key, number of
keys, etc.
Trust Rules are created by key value pairs, operators: =,<,>, AND,
NOT, OR and built-in functions: GROUP, CONTAINS, BEGINSWITH,
ENDSWITH. The key can be any OpenPGP field and the value is any
valid input for that respective field. A Trust Rule may be made of one
or more expressions. Each of these expressions have the form of: Expression
= ‘OpenPGP field’ Operator OR Keyword ‘value’. A Trust Rule may com-




• Equals “=” : Is the comparison operator in which a string or nu-
merical comparison is done on the key and its value pair. A successful
comparison will result in a true condition.
• Less than “<” : Is the less than operator in which a numerical com-
parison is done either integer or date wise comparison. A successful
comparison (of lesser value) will result in a true condition.
• More than “>” : Is the more than operator in which a numerical
comparison is done either integer or date wise comparison. A successful
comparison (of more value) will result in a true condition.
• AND : Is the AND operator which performs a logical conjunction on
two expressions which outputs the result. Both expressions are required
to be true for a true output.
• NOT : Is the NOT or Negative operator which performs the negation
of an operation. Such that the result of an operation is the direct
opposite from what it should have been. True becomes false and false
becomes true.
• OR : Is the OR operator which performs a logical disjunction on two
expression which outputs the results. Both expressions are required to




Functions may be used anywhere an expression would be allowed.
• GROUP: is used to allow the evaluation of a group of values with
a threshold for valid (successful) evaluation. It has the format of
GROUP(key,threshold) {item1, item2, item3, ... itemN} where thresh-
old is an integer value that must be met for the evaluation to be true
and item1 through itemN are a list of values to compare against.
• CONTAINS: is used to do a sub string comparison search on a field.
CONTAINS returns true if a sub string match has been found within
the parent search string. Its format is CONTAINS(key,subString) where
key is the OpenPGP field name and subString is the search string that
if found within key will return true.
• BEGINSWITH: is used to search a key value for a sub string at
the beginning of a string. The search is anchored at the beginning
of the parent string and only returns true if the parent string starts
with and matches the sub string specified. Its format is BEGIN-
SWITH(key,subString) where key is the OpenPGP field name and sub-
String is the search string that is anchored at the beginning.
• ENDSWITH: is used to search a key value for a sub string at the
end of a string. The search is anchored at the end of the parent string
and only returns true if the parent string ends with and matches the
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sub string specified. Its format is ENDSWITH(key,subString) where
key is the OpenPGP field name and subString is the search string and
anchored at the end.
5.3.3 Example Trust Rules:
To tag all Version 4 OpenPGP keys it can be written as:
Version 4 Keys: Version Number = 4
To tag all RIT keys within our key ring it can be written as:
RIT Keys: ENDSWITH(User ID, ‘‘rit.edu’’)






Notice the use of the User ID. This would then require that the key being
evaluated also belong to an rit.edu entity and not allow any keys which only
satisfy the GROUP clause to succeed. Also, for display purposes this thesis
has used Key IDs, when in implementation the use of key fingerprints or the
keys themselves should be used to prevent collisions within rules.
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5.4 Resistance:
In developing new Trust Rules for use in our new model this thesis makes sure
that the rules are resistant against attacks from outsiders and eavesdroppers.
It may be possible for an attacker to setup an entire network of Certification
Authority Servers, End User Keys, Signatures, etc. so that they could insert
their mistaken OpenPGP keys into a good system. To prevent this, the thesis
has proposed a system and trust model that is resistant to false claims while
still allowing collaboration. Such a system should be setup to verify claims
through more than one party and utilize a system that rewards good parties
and punishes bad parties.
5.4.1 Web of Trust:
The Web of Trust is resistant to brute attacks such as the previous example
as long as each single user verifies keys manually. If a user starts to sign
keys indiscriminately and does not verify the identity or the key holder they
degrade the value of their own signature. This degradation of signatures can
eventually affect the entire web, however, the person would hopefully obtain
a reputation of not carefully verifying keys. This reputation mechanism is
mostly social and would not strictly insure that our good web of trust is
maintained. It is feasible that an entire network of false keys may be setup
and interconnected that is entirely false. This false network could appear
to be a valid and good behaving part of the web with interconnected key
signatures, but is in fact all run by an attacker.
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While manual verification can be burdensome, it is vital to maintaining
a proper Web of Trust. This verification however, sometimes is impossible
given the miles that may exist between communicating entities. So, to forgo
this manual verification one can use third-party verifiers or “Trusted Intro-
ducers” to perform this verification. This however, has the affect of allowing
the Trusted Introducer free reign over what they claim to be valid. Once
trusted a Certification Authority or Trusted Introducer is free to sign any
key they wish, which in fact could be an attackers key. Our trust model
can combat this side affect by requiring, if desired, that more third parties
verify the identity and certification claims of these Trusted Introducer or
Certification Authorities.
5.4.2 Our Trust Model:
Through the use of multiple trusted third parties this thesis wishes to miti-
gate one or more rogue certification authorities from polluting the signature
web with false claims. These third party authorities are chosen by the end
user and inserted into a Trust Rule with the GROUP function so that a sub-
set of them must agree before tagging the key as valid. By using an internal
non-exportable trust packet the thesis prevents the user from automatically
signing keys without the manual verification that should be required. Sig-
natures by end users should denote verification of identity by said user, not
the successful evaluation of a user’s established Trust Rule(s). Users are
free to create their own set of Trust Rules based on their group interactions
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and own personal security requirements. By not allowing the exportation of
Trust Signatures and the automatic signing of keys this thesis presents that
our trust model can maintain the resistance to attack that the Web of Trust
has while increasing the ease of use.
5.5 Resilience:
Any crypto-system or trust model needs to be resilient in the face of attackers.
The need to identify and recover from attacks is paramount, since attacks
and the possibility of compromise should be expected. The ability to deal
with and recover from an attack is as vital as the system’s ability to resist an
attack. Our trust model allows for the recovery from an attack the same way
as the Web of Trust deals with attacks, through the revocation of signatures
and keys.
5.5.1 Web of Trust:
If a user has signed a key with their signature and they no longer believe the
key represents or belongs to the certified person claimed by the key the said
signature may be revoked by the user. (One should wonder how carefully
they verified the identity of the person to begin with before signing the key.)
In this case the user has stopped certifying the other users identity and key
pairing.
There are other reasons that a signature may be revoked, such as an
employee leaving a business which included an email address and associated
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OpenPGP key. The revocation of the key in this case does not state that
the key identity is in question only that the person in question no longer
maintains a persona with that company. If not revoked it may appear that
the person still maintains an email address and works for said company.
If a user feels their own keys may have been compromised they can revoke
the entire OpenPGP key. This could be very bad for the user as they will
lose all the accumulated signatures on that OpenPGP key and will have to
collect them again, that is have others sign the new key. In the case of a key
compromise the revocation should state as such with a “Key material has
been compromised” signature.
5.5.2 Our Trust Model:
While our model uses the same revocation technique as the Web of Trust
it does have some intricacies when a trusted third party has been found to
be non-trust worthy. Lets look at what would normally happen if a Trusted
Introducer was found not to be so trustworthy. First, the user would revoke
their signature and remove the Trusted Introducer from their trusted list.
Next, all the trust calculations would need to be recalculated. After these
calculations any key that was only verified by the now distrusted party would
need to be removed from the trusted section of the keyring.
With our trust model the revocation of a trusted certifier would also
include a recalculation of trust, but the revocation of a signature would only
be required if the user signed the key. A signature of trust is not needed
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in our trust model, but can be used to further enhance security, only the
inclusion in a Trust Rule is required. Obviously the Trust Rules must be
updated to exclude the untrustworthy certifier.
5.6 Usability:
This thesis needs to make sure its new trust model is easy to use. In software
testing of PGP version 5.0 Whitten and Tygar [45] found that many users
could not create keys and other associated OpenPGP tasks in a respectable
time frame. End users can become easily confused and need easy to un-
derstand visual clues. In developing our Trust Rules interface this thesis has
used a common window type that users should already be familiar with. The
window is based on Mozilla Thurderbird’s [9] email filter window. A mock-up
of a proposed window for adding tags is shown in Figure 2.
In Figure 2 this thesis presents an example of a Trust Rule that would
match all keys that end with “rit.edu” thus matching all RIT email. These
keys will then be tagged with RIT. While this example is somewhat simple
the idea of being able to sort and classify keys in an automatic fashion allows
us to quickly and easily setup our Trust Rules and then go about our business
of using the keys in communication. Once Trust Rules have been defined this
should reduce the amount of time spent by the end user analyzing keys and
the signatures that certify them. This manual process can now be carried
out by the Trust Rules with keys tagged as the user has decided. The user
only has to import the new key into their keyring and the Trust Rules will
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Figure 2: Mock-up of adding a Trust Rule.
be evaluated and the key tagged automatically.
In establishing the relationship between tagged keys and non tagged keys
this thesis presents the need to keep it clear in the end users mind, otherwise
their assumptions might be misplaced. The interface should make it clear
that tagged keys are not the same as Trusted Keys which have been verified
and signed by the user. Tags allow for automatic sorting and classification of
keys into groups. The tags or groups might have increased security associated
with them, but that may not always be the case. Since the user is capable of
establishing any Trust Rule that they wish, it may be that they have added
Trust Rules that do not have any additional security benefit. The decision
of establishing more trust in tagged keys should be left to the end user and
how they implement their Trust Rules. Each end user should know if a Trust
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Rule is for security or nearly for sorting and classification. With that in mind
this thesis is treating all tagged keys as a separate case from Trusted Keys,
but not grouping them in with “Other Collected Keys” as some software
packages call non trusted keys. This distinction should be clear after looking
at Figure 3 which shows a mock-up of how this thesis see Tagged Keys being
integrated with current software packages.
Figure 3: Mock-up of Key Management using Tags.
To denote the distinction that this thesis would wish to keep between
Trusted Keys, Other Collected Keys, and Tagged Keys another tab has been
created for the Tagged Keys as shown in Figure 3. This mock-up was derived
from the encryption manager Seahorse version 2.20.1 [10]. Notice that a
“Tagged Keys” tab to the already available tabs. It also tagged the keys as
“opensc” because they belong to opensc mailing list participants. With the
presented mock-up this thesis hopes it provides an easy to use interface for
the end user to interact with.
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6 Evaluation:
In this section the thesis will evaluate our new trust model through user case
studies and later with some quantitative analysis. This thesis presents where
Trust Rules makes sense for the end user and how it can simplify the key
verification process.
6.1 User Case Study:
6.1.1 Rochester Institute of Technology:
Using RIT as an example, RIT could automatically sign one PGP key for
all authenticated users through an online system that integrates into the
campus email system or other online services, such as myRIT. Next, each
department could sign a user’s key if certain requirements are met such as:
physical presentation of RIT ID, membership in said department, RIT ID
Number, RIT username, and OpenPGP key fingerprint. The RIT ID should
be used to confirm the persons identity, and also match with the person’s ID
picture with the picture on their OpenPGP key. After this all users in the
department and the rest of RIT would know that:
1. The user is a current RIT student/faculty/staff.
2. The user is a member of a particular department.
3. The user’s picture is correct.
4. The user’s public key has been manually confirmed.
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The key would only be considered valid if two signatures are on the key: one
by RIT and one by the department to which the person belongs. The model
that this thesis has described above requires two signatures to be valid. This
simple model would prevent an attacker at any one department from falsely
verifying keys, because they must first be signed by RIT.
6.1.2 Evaluation of Model:
In evaluating the model and how it works for this case or class of organiza-
tion this thesis has evaluated how the model compares to other trust models.
First, with X.509 Certificates it is not possible to prevent or limit key signa-
tures once a Certification Authority has been trusted. All signatures issued
by a CA will be trusted. So, our model is more flexible than X.509. Second,
in comparison to OpenPGP Web of Trust this thesis finds that there would
be a reliance on one person to establish the trust of keys. This reliance
reduces security because of the possibility of compromise and it also goes
against our established criteria for a new trust model. X.509 does have the
ability to distribute Certifications Authority roles to multiple entities, but
each can sign and establish new keys completely independent of each other.
Our model as described with the established Trust Rules would allow for




Using MySpace, Xanga, bebo, flickr, FaceBook, or any other social network-
ing site as an example this thesis presents a secure mechanism for key ex-
change and verification of identity. The website itself could sign keys of in-
dividual users thereby verifying the digital pseudonym. After which friends
and associates can verify the information in person. These contacts may be
new friends found through the website. Community friends can meet to ver-
ify identity and once a threshold of key signatures has been established the
group or community Trust Rule would be evaluated and make the person a
member in good standing with the community. These networks are already
established and can provide a number of contacts with which a user may
communicate. By having the community develop the rules and sign keys it
provides incentive for new users to join in with secure communications and
lowers the bar for new secure pathways to develop. If an individual had to
approach each user and verify their key it would be a daunting task, but with
the community undertaking this task it distributes the load and allows for
quicker keyring creation. This social networking model would mostly verify
digital pseudonyms, but can be mixed with other trust models, since the
model itself does not prevent multiple rules being run simultaneously.
6.1.4 Evaluation of Model:
In this form the Trust Rules are developed by the group or community that
is going to use them. The specifications of the group need to be satisfied. In
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this case there is a high barrier to enter, because of cost. The cost of setting
up a Certification Authority or other type of structure for each community
would be prohibitive. Our trust model, however allows for each group to
have their own rules and to operate completely independently of each other.
6.2 Quantitative Analysis:
6.2.1 Number of Signatures:
In analyzing our trust model this thesis has picked a particular Trust Rule to
analyze. While other Trust Rules may be developed the best general purpose
Trust Rule this thesis presents is the N of K Servers Trust Rule. The thesis
will evaluate this Trust Rule with a purposed threshold where N = 10 and
K = 15|20 servers. Thus the Trust Rule will have the following format:
Trusted Keys: GROUP(Issuer,10){keyID1, keyID2, keyID3,
keyID4, keyID5,..., keyID15|20}
This should provide the right amount of servers for there to be competition
among the authentication severs while maintaining a small enough number
to be feasible. The threshold is chosen so that a large percentage of servers
must agree before a key is verified as valid. For increased security one only
has to increase the value of N to a larger percentage of K.
To analyze our chosen Trust Rule this thesis evaluates the number of sig-
natures versus the number of total users in a given population. For our Trust
Rule with the threshold for the GROUP function set at 10 the maximum sig-
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natures any user should be required to get would be 10. This maximum is
shown in Figure 4 where it has been graphed and used for our analysis. Next,
this thesis compared our model with those of other types of trust system, such
as X.509 Certificates and the more traditional Web of Trust. The Web of
Trust worst case scenarios is that each user has to obtain every other users
signature. That is, the total number of signatures is equal to the total num-
ber of users. The Web of Trust is graphed in Figure 4 as well. The Web of
Trust best case scenarios is one where every person in the web knows enough
people to connect themselves with everyone else in the network through just
one hope. Or put differently, if I know 10 people and those 10 people know
another 10 people we have just connected 100 people while allowing myself
to only know the first 10 people directly. This relationship through friends is
established with a limit of knowing the next person only through one other
person. The relationship can not be a distance greater than one person away.
This best case Web of Trust relationship happens to be S =
√
U where S is
the number of signatures required and U is the number of total users. This
best case is of course a best case and not very probable in the real world,
because each person would need to know distinctly different people and never
overlap, otherwise the number of signatures required by each person would
have to be increased because of duplication. Finally, this thesis has graphed
X.509 Certificates by showing that only one signature or certification is re-
quired. By having Certification Authorities integrated into Operating Sys-
tems, Web Browsers, and Email clients it reduces the certifications down to
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only one as long as an already trusted CA is chosen.
Figure 4: Number of Users Versus the Number of Signatures.
Now that this thesis has presented the different trust models graphed
in Figure 4 it is possible to analyze the trust models and evaluate each by
comparing their intersections, and respective slopes. First this thesis presents
that all of the trust models start with one signature where as the Trust Rules
starts with ten required signatures. As users are added to the network/web
each model requires more and more signatures, except the X.509 trust model
and Trust Rules. The X.509 trust model incorporates Certification Author-
ities certificates into the host computer via the Operating System or User
Application Programs. Because of this X.509 only requires one signature
from an already trusted CA to be almost one hundred percent accepted.
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Trust Rules does not require more signatures because this thesis has decided
to use fifteen to twenty certification authorities to establish our trust in an
end user’s identity. These same CAs will be used regardless of the number
of users in the network.
Next, this thesis presents that the slopes and associated number of sig-
natures differ between the worst case and best case scenarios of the Web of
Trust model. As stated previously, the worst case is S = U and the best
case is S =
√
U where S is the number of signatures and U is the number
of users. Any slope that is less than that of the best case scenarios can be
considered an improvement by reducing the total number of required signa-
tures. That being said, the security of such a system might be questioned
if the number of required signatures is substantially lower. There may be
a compromise between ease of introduction into the encryption system and
sustained security over time as new users are added.
In evaluating where our Trust Rules model with its current rules may be
used, it appears that it would be a good model when the number of users if
over ten. Even though it does not surpass the Web of Trust best case until
over one hundred users our Trust Rules would probably be a good choice.
This is because the best case scenarios is less likely to appear in the real
world. It is more reasonable to assert that the required number of signatures




More research needs to be done into using X.509 with Trust Rules. This
thesis chose OpenPGP because of its lack of rigid structure and reliance in
a hierarchical tree and because there was a clear path to implementing our
Trust Rules within software packages with minimal specification and applica-
tion changes. This does not forgo the X.509 Trust Model from implementing
Trust Rules or another type of conditional rule-based system, but it appears
at this time that there would be substantial work involved in application,
specification, and social change. There is already a widely used system de-
veloped around X.509 certificates, so that would further complicate the de-
velopment of a new trust model for that system. The trust model would
more likely need to make better business sense economically than it would
security wise to be adopted. It still would be possible and interesting to see
some type of conditional rule-based trust model implemented in X.509.
7.2 Additional Trust Rules:
This thesis has explored a very limited scope with regards to the many possi-
ble Trust Rules that could be developed. Many different Trust Rules need to
be developed and evaluated to test their security additions or subtractions.
Because of the flexibility Trust Rules can very easily be written poorly in a
manner that would harm the end users security. Such a Trust Rule would be
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counting the number of signatures on a given key. If such a Trust Rule were
put into place it could easily be bypassed by an attacker.
Our current Trust Rule has a slope of zero and does not scale as the
number of users scales. While this can be a feature it can also be a security
weakness, as each Certification Authority is trusted with more and more
verifications. To combat this reliance on any one Certification Authority this
thesis would need to develop a Trust Rule that scales some, but one that
does not have a slope greater than OpenPGP Web of Trust. There could
also be a Trust Rule that steps up the threshold when a given number of
keys is trusted through that rule. As more keys are trusted through a given
rule that rule’s threshold could automatically be increased so that the total
amount of trust in any set of Certification Authorities is reduced.
7.3 Email Integration:
A natural extension to Trust Rules would be to integrate the tags feature
into an email client so that it can be used for sorting and other email related
tasks. The tags could be used to automatically bypass spam filtering allowing




This thesis presents that “Trust Rules” can provide a service that until now
has been missing in most cyrptosystems. The use of user established rules
provides the user with greater flexibility and the ability to decide their own
security requirements. This thesis sees conditional trust through the use of
rule-based matching and key identification as a natural evolution from man-
ual key verification. Through the use of tags the end user may easily organize
and catalog their keys to enhance their security landscape. These rules can
be very simple and provide organization only, or they may be very complex
and incorporate multiple Certification Authorities and automatic key revo-
cation. In either case this thesis find the reduction in manual steps taken
through automatic signature key review and verification appealing. This the-
sis presents that general purpose “Trust Rules” as outlined will work for most
users in establishing key validity and trust. For those more advanced or more
security conscious users a mixing of “Trust Rules” and Web of Trust manual
verification is possible. Our trust model does not prevent continued use of
the Web of Trust, but merely makes additions to user interactions to make
some processes more automated. This thesis presents that the automated
tag feature would enhance any user’s experience so that they may organize
their keyring more effectively. Overall, this thesis presents “Trust Rules”
with tagging as a valid option regardless of the user’s security preferences.
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The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Rec. X.800 & Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization ISO 7498-2 [26] defines terms which
are important to this thesis and are outlined below.
Asymmetric (encipherment): (e.g. public key) encipherment, in which
knowledge of the encipherment key does not imply knowledge of the
decipherment key, or vice versa. The two keys of such a system are
sometimes referred to as the “public key” and the “private key”.
Authentication exchange: A mechanism intended to ensure the identity
of an entity by means of information exchange.
Authentication information: Information used to establish the validity
of a claimed identity.
Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.
Credentials: Data that is transferred to establish the claimed identity of
an entity.
Cryptography: The discipline which embodies principles, means, and meth-
ods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information
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content, prevent its undetected modification and/or prevent its unau-
thorized use.
Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data
received is as claimed.
Decipherment: The reversal of a corresponding reversible encipherment.
Decryption: See decipherment.
Digital signature: Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation
(see cryptography) of a data unit that allows a recipient of the data
unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect
against forgery e.g. by the recipient.
Encipherment: The cryptographic transformation of data (see cryptogra-
phy) to produce ciphertext.
Encryption: See encipherment.
Key: A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of encipherment
and decipherment.
Key management: The generation, storage, distribution, deletion, archiv-
ing and application of keys in accordance with a security policy.
Repudiation: Denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of
having participated in all or part of the communication.
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Password: Confidential authentication information, usually composed of a
string of characters.
Peer-entity authentication: The corroboration that a peer entity in an
association is the one claimed.
Privacy: The right of individuals to control or influence what information
related to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to whom
that information may be disclosed.
Signature: See digital signature.
Symmetric (encipherment): (i.e. secret key) encipherment, in which knowl-
edge of the encipherment key implies knowledge of the decipherment
key and vice versa.
The following terminology is defined in ITU-T X.509 [29]:
Certificate revocation list (CRL): A signed list indicating a set of cer-
tificates that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer. In
addition to the generic term CRL, some specific CRL types are defined
for CRLs that cover particular scopes.
Certificate validation: The process of ensuring that a certificate was valid
at a given time, including possibly the construction and processing of
a certification path, and ensuring that all certificates in that path were
valid (i.e., were not expired or revoked) at that given time.
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Certification authority (CA): An authority trusted by one or more users
to create and assign public-key certificates. Optionally the certification
authority may create the users’ keys.
CRL distribution point: A directory entry or other distribution source
for CRLs; a CRL distributed through a CRL distribution point may
contain revocation entries for only a subset of the full set of certificates
issued by one CA or may contain revocation entries for multiple CAs.
Hash function: A (mathematical) function which maps values from a large
(possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A “good” hash
function is such that the results of applying the function to a (large)
set of values in the domain will be evenly distributed (and apparently
at random) over the range.
Key agreement: A method for negotiating a key value on-line without
transferring the key, even in an encrypted form, e.g., the Diffie-Hellman
technique.
Private key: (In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user’s key pair
which is known only by that user.
Public-key: (In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user’s key pair
which is publicly known.
Public-key certificate (PKC): The public key of a user, together with
some other information, rendered unforgeable by digital signature with
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the private key of the certification authority which issued it.
Public key infrastructure (PKI): The infrastructure able to support the
management of public keys able to support authentication, encryption,
integrity or non-repudiation services.
Simple authentication: Authentication by means of simple password ar-
rangements.
Strong authentication: Authentication by means of cryptographically de-
rived credentials.
Trust: Generally, an entity can be said to “trust” a second entity when
it (the first entity) makes the assumption that the second entity will
behave exactly as the first entity expects. This trust may apply only
for some specific function. The key role of trust in this framework is
to describe the relationship between an authenticating entity and an
authority; an entity shall be certain that it can trust the authority to
create only valid and reliable certificates.
RFC 4880 defines the following terminology:
Keyring: A keyring is a collection of one or more keys in a file or database.
Traditionally, a keyring is simply a sequential list of keys, but may be
any suitable database.
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A.2 Top 50 OpenPGP Keys, 2008
Data Collected from: 2008-04-13 Dataset available at http://keyserver.kjsl.com/ka/
Rank Key ID Name MSD
1 94C09C7F Peter Palfrader 3.5555
2 68FD549F Martin Michlmayr 3.6357
3 C82E0039 Peter Palfrader 3.6473
4 F081195D Matthias Bauer 3.6479
5 E263FCD4 Kurt Gramlich 3.6562
6 75BE8097 Florian Lohoff 3.6574
7 248AEB73 Rene Engelhard 3.6629
8 3F3E6426 Guido Guenther 3.6668
9 74E0B766 Andreas Mueller 3.6762
10 607559E6 Benjamin Hill (Mako) 3.6793
11 307D56ED Nol Kthe 3.6855
12 00D8CD16 Alexander Schmehl 3.6890
13 797EBFAB Enrico Zini 3.6978
14 F2CF01A8 Bdale Garbee 3.7071
15 C99870B1 Benjamin Hill (Mako) 3.7282
16 BC7D020A Alexander Wirt 3.7318
17 C158CCED Florian Lohoff 3.7325
18 CD15A883 Alexander Schmehl (private) 3.7337
19 258D8781 Michael Bramer 3.7388
20 7E7B8AC9 Joerg Jaspert 3.7436
21 19C9B6BA Maximilian Wilhelm (uni) 3.7437
22 2BE16D01 Moray Allan 3.7484
23 5706A4B4 Simon Richter 3.7521
24 0F7A8D01 Norbert Tretkowski 3.7522
25 BD8B050D Roland Rosenfeld 3.7528
26 9B7C328D Luk Claes 3.7532
27 9ED101BF Michael Banck 3.7646
28 3E8DCCC0 Martin Wuertele 3.7706
29 3FCC2A90 Amaya Rodrigo Sastre 3.7743
30 E10F502E Marcus Frings 3.7764
31 EE0977E8 Jens Kubieziel 3.7790
32 1BF8DE0F Roland Stigge (ernie) 3.7826
33 29499F61 Sam Hocevar 3.7849
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34 A0ED982D Christian Brueffer 3.7931
35 5A35FD42 Christoph Ulrich Scholler (FNB) 3.7968
36 5D64F870 Martin Zobel-Helas 3.7975
37 29F19BD1 Dr. Michael Meskes 3.7994
38 46F3212D LaMont Jones 3.7994
39 44779E18 Fabio Massimo Di Nitto 3.8021
40 253E58E3 Noah Heusser 3.8042
41 9C67CD96 Torsten Veller 3.8086
42 58510B5A Christoph Berg 3.8090
43 D98502C5 Elmar Hoffmann 3.8099
44 8A724E45 Stefan Roehrich 3.8112
45 DD934139 Patrick Feisthammel 3.8123
46 5B0358A2 Werner Koch 3.8124
47 95FECA34 Volker Gueth 3.8126
48 969457F0 Joost van Baal 3.8150
49 CF3401A9 Elmar Hoffmann 3.8185
50 6D8ABE71 Christoph Berg 3.8250
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A.3 Top 50 OpenPGP Keys Graph
Figure 5: Graph of Top 50 OpenPGP Keys ranked by MSD. 2008
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A.4 Top 50 OpenPGP Keys, 2013
Data Collected from: 2013-08-25 Dataset available at http://pgp.cs.uu.nl/doc/top 50.html
Rank Key ID Name MSD
1 94C09C7F Peter Palfrader 3.57031
2 607559E6 Benjamin Hill (Mako) 3.64598
3 C82E0039 Peter Palfrader 3.64762
4 65D0FD58 CA Cert Signing Authority (Root CA)3.65037
5 68FD549F Martin Michlmayr 3.67061
6 AAE6022E Karlheinz Geyer (TUD) 3.67124
7 307D56ED Nol Kthe 3.69334
8 E263FCD4 Kurt Gramlich 3.69883
9 248AEB73 Rene Engelhard 3.70122
10 C99870B1 Benjamin Hill (Mako) 3.70254
11 F2CF01A8 Bdale Garbee 3.70501
12 797EBFAB Enrico Zini 3.71041
13 BAB58229 Marcus Frings (Work) 3.72188
14 E10F502E Marcus Frings 3.72582
15 BD8B050D Roland Rosenfeld 3.73317
16 74E0B766 Andreas Mueller 3.74222
17 3F3E6426 Guido Gnther 3.74547
18 F081195D Matthias Bauer 3.74649
19 75BE8097 Florian Lohoff 3.75182
20 BC7D020A Alexander Wirt 3.75615
21 9B7C328D Luk Claes 3.76101
22 7E7B8AC9 Joerg Jaspert 3.77075
23 19C9B6BA Maximilian Wilhelm 3.78249
24 2BE16D01 Moray Allan 3.78292
25 58510B5A Christoph Berg 3.79384
26 D98502C5 Elmar Hoffmann 3.79597
27 4743206C Joachim Breitner 3.80009
28 88C7C1F7 Steve McIntyre 3.80134
29 5706A4B4 Simon Richter 3.80223
30 9ED101BF Michael Banck 3.80293
31 29F19BD1 Michael Meskes 3.80393
32 9C67CD96 Torsten Veller 3.80644
33 EE0977E8 Jens Kubieziel 3.81234
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34 CF3401A9 Elmar Hoffmann 3.81279
35 C0143D2D Christian Perrier 3.81391
36 5D64F870 Martin Zobel-Helas 3.81935
37 1880283C Anibal Monsalve Salazar 3.82135
38 C158CCED Florian Lohoff 3.8221
39 969457F0 Joost van Baal 3.82294
40 EC152942 Gerfried Fuchs 3.82378
41 0F7A8D01 Norbert Tretkowski 3.82437
42 8501C7FC Sebastian Harl 3.825
43 5A35FD42 Christoph Ulrich Scholler (FNB) 3.82564
44 98016DC7 Josef Spillner 3.83135
45 A0ED982D Christian Brueffer 3.83323
46 258D8781 Michael Bramer 3.83393
47 253E58E3 Noah Heusser 3.83535
48 29499F61 Sam Hocevar 3.83644
49 7244970B Kurt Roeckx 3.83852
50 44779E18 Fabio M. Di Nitto 3.84032
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A.5 Top 50 OpenPGP Keys Compared
Comparison of 2013 data to 2008 to note changes in the top 50 keys sorted
by MSD. Key statistics: 6% No Change, 22% New, 28% Upward Moving,
44% Downward Moving.
Rank Name MSD Change
1 Peter Palfrader 3.57031 No Change
2 Benjamin Hill (Mako) 3.64598 ↑ 10th
3 Peter Palfrader 3.64762 No Change
4 CA Cert Signing Authority (Root CA)3.65037 NEW
5 Martin Michlmayr 3.67061 ↓ 2nd
6 Karlheinz Geyer (TUD) 3.67124 NEW
7 Nol Kthe 3.69334 ↑ 11th
8 Kurt Gramlich 3.69883 ↓ 5th
9 Rene Engelhard 3.70122 ↓ 7th
10 Benjamin Hill (Mako) 3.70254 ↑ 15th
11 Bdale Garbee 3.70501 ↑ 14th
12 Enrico Zini 3.71041 ↑ 13th
13 Marcus Frings (Work) 3.72188 NEW
14 Marcus Frings 3.72582 ↑ 30th
15 Roland Rosenfeld 3.73317 ↑ 25th
16 Andreas Mueller 3.74222 ↓ 9th
17 Guido Gnther 3.74547 ↓ 8th
18 Matthias Bauer 3.74649 ↓ 4th
19 Florian Lohoff 3.75182 ↓ 6th
20 Alexander Wirt 3.75615 ↓ 16th
21 Luk Claes 3.76101 ↑ 26th
22 Joerg Jaspert 3.77075 ↓ 10th
23 Maximilian Wilhelm 3.78249 ↓ 21st
24 Moray Allan 3.78292 ↓ 22nd
25 Christoph Berg 3.79384 ↑ 42nd
26 Elmar Hoffmann 3.79597 ↑ 43rd
27 Joachim Breitner 3.80009 NEW
28 Steve McIntyre 3.80134 NEW
29 Simon Richter 3.80223 ↓ 23rd
30 Michael Banck 3.80293 ↓ 27th
31 Michael Meskes 3.80393 ↑ 37th
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32 Torsten Veller 3.80644 ↑ 41st
33 Jens Kubieziel 3.81234 ↓ 31st
34 Elmar Hoffmann 3.81279 ↑ 43rd
35 Christian Perrier 3.81391 NEW
36 Martin Zobel-Helas 3.81935 No Change
37 Anibal Monsalve Salazar 3.82135 NEW
38 Florian Lohoff 3.8221 ↓ 17th
39 Joost van Baal 3.82294 ↑ 48th
40 Gerfried Fuchs 3.82378 NEW
41 Norbert Tretkowski 3.82437 ↓ 24th
42 Sebastian Harl 3.825 NEW
43 Christoph Ulrich Scholler (FNB) 3.82564 ↓ 35th
44 Josef Spillner 3.83135 NEW
45 Christian Brueffer 3.83323 ↓ 34th
46 Michael Bramer 3.83393 ↓ 19th
47 Noah Heusser 3.83535 ↓ 40th
48 Sam Hocevar 3.83644 ↓ 33rd
49 Kurt Roeckx 3.83852 NEW
50 Fabio M. Di Nitto 3.84032 ↓ 39th
Footnotes: Analysis of ”NEW” Keys – AAE6022E, Karlheinz Geyer has
1030 cross signatures. BAB58229, Marcus Frings has 526 cross signatures.
4743206C, Joachim Breitner has 259 cross signatures. 88C7C1F7, Steve
McIntyre has 269 cross signatures.
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A.6 OpenPGP Keys 950-1000 Ranked by MSD
Data Collected from: 2008-04-13 Dataset available at http://keyserver.kjsl.com/ka/
Rank Key ID Name MSD
950 4F0BEABB Klaus J. Mueller 4.2779
951 BF85AB31 Matthias Kalle Dalheimer 4.2779
952 4FC59E44 Alexander Schremmer 4.2785
953 632C74BF Julian Baeume 4.2785
954 C81115B1 Sebastian Jaenicke 4.2787
955 DC426429 Frank Thomas 4.2788
956 D7FA4512 Joerg Schmitz-Linneweber 4.2790
957 89754606 Rick van Rein (business) 4.2792
958 D1813CED Achim Dreyer (signing key) 4.2794
959 B83A8797 Sven Lankes 4.2795
960 58536791 Andrew Tridgell 4.2798
961 7CDC44F3 Karl Deutsch 4.2802
962 DF118AF1 Havard Eidnes 4.2802
963 5E642B40 Frank Matthie 4.2803
964 9DED2AA5 Moritz Muehlenhoff 4.2805
965 7DFF8533 peter honeyman 4.2820
966 F681E4CE Jan Schmidle 4.2820
967 56BA5951 Jan Willem Knopper 4.2824
968 6248BA12 Israel Herraiz 4.2826
969 293697C2 Florian Reitmeir 4.2827
970 7032F238 Jon Dowland 4.2831
971 44DD7643 Georg Nikodym 4.2832
972 6F268727 Nathan Lutchansky 4.2849
973 E3046DF3 Jos De Graeve 4.2849
974 1242A6F2 Simon Hausmann 4.2850
975 B98F8E89 Darryl Ross 4.2850
976 A1EE761C Pierre Habouzit 4.2854
977 1AAAC2A4 Andreas Mller (Student) 4.2854
978 F2D58DB1 DFN-PCA, CERTIFICATION 4.2857
979 890B15B2 Alberto Garcia Gonzalez 4.2858
980 7A588C62 Mark Knox 4.2862
981 627CCF95 Bas Wijnen 4.2866
982 5D54A300 Jeff Snyder 4.2869
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983 E12469C1 Ruediger Weis 4.2875
984 7FFA98B4 Jean-Francois PARIS (certificat) 4.2876
985 DA4A1116 Bernhard E. Reiter 4.2879
986 EC63E6B7 Jos De Graeve 4.2879
987 00292B81 Nathalie Weiler 4.2880
988 F61F73F8 Bastian Venthur 4.2882
989 49E2CF4C Paul Mackerras 4.2883
990 EB9CDAD5 Eduardo Marcel Macan 4.2884
991 73FAAFF8 Christophe Mutricy 4.2885
992 09D9E662 Jonathan Kleinehellefort 4.2885
993 DDAF6454 Bernhard Walle 4.2890
994 5E35DB91 Stephan Rutten 4.2890
995 13A9EA7C Ellis Whitehead 4.2892
996 6D742669 Luca Capello 4.2894
997 9DFFAAD4 Ludovic Brenta 4.2895
998 B65C0BE9 Ralf Meyer 4.2897
999 97B3E98E Matthias Reich 4.2902
1000 57EF3E4F Michael Clark 4.2904
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A.7 OpenPGP Keys 950-1000 Graph
Figure 6: Graph of OpenPGP Keys 950-1000 ranked by MSD.
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A.8 OpenPGP Keys 99950-100000 Ranked by MSD
Data Collected from: 2008-04-13 Dataset available at http://keyserver.kjsl.com/ka/
Rank Key Fingerprint MSD
99950 412955B6 E1718941 8.2315
99951 C86D3413 991C6A37 8.2316
99952 CF7C9D61 F6B815D5 8.2316
99953 7AC02409 3393825D 8.2318
99954 AAA50CDB AC72D729 8.2318
99955 3F4B27A3 131CE23D 8.2332
99956 FB43C837 44EBF755 8.2332
99957 15B6C4E3 5B980B91 8.2333
99958 5C3D8D98 363A8D16 8.2333
99959 67FDD15A 6990EC20 8.2336
99960 C12A3E91 1060E131 8.2336
99961 F977B8B1 AE242AF4 8.2336
99962 F5F858F3 40ACFE10 8.2341
99963 4462C983 4A43FD91 8.2344
99964 1D347C60 3022C2C4 8.2349
99965 6AC7682D 0CA023CD 8.2349
99966 E44D7F40 260E7CD9 8.2349
99967 77393AA4 F33F7925 8.2350
99968 9177F43A 8902B779 8.2351
99969 5DBDDFBD 88F93E1B 8.2354
99970 71210ED5 98EC95E9 8.2362
99971 A0118797 212AC8DE 8.2362
99972 C7595F95 4A056405 8.2362
99973 FC88DE4D 2B26ED5A 8.2362
99974 0AF213DC 2D6B0399 8.2367
99975 3C805297 97793FAD 8.2367
99976 8E7B0A86 8B6EF60C 8.2367
99977 A8F23271 7BB2AEC0 8.2367
99978 AF9E3FAB B0D1AC83 8.2367
99979 B0AA9F2F BC975EBD 8.2367
99980 D67F988B 4BE0704F 8.2367
99981 DCB89031 A969CE49 8.2367
99982 FA658070 63327EE2 8.2367
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99983 FFB18E1E 88C674B6 8.2367
99984 722A7604 45DECC8F 8.2370
99985 4939AD4B 58BDA1AA 8.2373
99986 81ACDE39 3E39B075 8.2373
99987 DCC4A93D 67E7FA7F 8.2373
99988 1D82AF3B B97B40E8 8.2376
99989 3845EA0A 9EF4EF9A 8.2376
99990 59F1952F 10A5F68E 8.2376
99991 8C2D81FD 190206B1 8.2376
99992 4852C81A EFE9177A 8.2380
99993 C07B1894 0A64A546 8.2380
99994 E0D429B9 68883D62 8.2380
99995 F33EC76B 2C5D876B 8.2380
99996 12F0D1A0 86077445 8.2386
99997 587D4B19 85745BB9 8.2386
99998 C97333BC 0E23E41E 8.2388
99999 CE8C4228 1B89134B 8.2388
100000 69164034 45E6F247 8.2390
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A.9 OpenPGP Keys 999950-100000 Graph
Figure 7: Graph of OpenPGP Keys 999950-100000 ranked by MSD.
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A.10 PGP Web of Trust Key Analysis
Key analysis data by Henk P. Penning [36] Data collected - August 2013
Figure 8: Size of Strong Set.
Figure 9: Average Mean Shortest Distance.
89
Figure 10: Average Degree (Signatures per Key).
Figure 11: Population change of strong set.
A.11 The Footsie Web of Trust analysis
Key analysis data by Matthew Wilcox [46] Data collected - August 2013
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Figure 12: Degree distribution over time.
Figure 13: Degree distribution for July 2013.
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Figure 14: Distance distribution.
Figure 15: MSD vs rank.
Figure 16: Strong Set ”Footsie” Index.
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Figure 17: Original Strong Set ”Footsie” Index.
Figure 18: Strong Set vs Reachable Set key size.
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